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CONDITIONAL SALES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES
WmwAm F STARR*
The contract of conditional sale and the chattel mortgage per-
form a similar economic function. They are the principal devices
by which the obligor may enjoy the use and possession of a chattel
in winch a security interest is held by another. Either may serve
to secure the payment to the vendor of the purchase money, while
m Washington the chattel mortgage only may be employed to
secure the repayment of a loan or the performance of other obliga-
tions. i
They arose out of different legal concepts, developed along dif-
ferent lines, gave rise to different rights and remedies, but in the
form of the two Uniform Acts have achieved a striking similarity
It is the object of this article to relate the history of these se-
curity instruments in the State of Washington, to show the legal
consequences of a choice between them, to point out a few of the
changes which would result from the adoption of either Uniform
Act in this State, and finally to offer for discussion suggestions for
a Composite Act covering the entire field of security in personal
property
TnEoRY AND FUNCTION
The sole function of a conditional sale contract is to enable the
vendor to deliver to the vendee possession of a chattel and retain
the legal title for his protection until the purchase price has been
paid. Under a conditional sale, as distinguished from a sale upon
condition, in case the vendee fails to .perform as agreed, the vendor
has a choice between asserting his right to enforce the affirmative
obligation of the vendee to pay the purchase price, which converts
it into an outright sale and vests legal title in the vendee or his
assignee free from any lien for the purchase money, or forfeiting
not only the vendee's right to acquire title but also any benefit to
which the vendee otherwise would be entitled by virtue of the pay-
ments already made. If the instrument gives the vendor this choice,
it will be regarded as a conditional sale, although the parties may
have termed it a lease. But a lease with a mere option to purchase
is not a conditional sale because the vendor cannot elect to hold
the lessee for the purchase price.1 However, if the so-called rent
*Of the Seattle Bar.
'Bank of Californa v. Clear Lake Ln mber Co., 146 Wash. 543, 264 Pac.
705 (1928). Likewise a bill of sale cannot be shown to be a mortgage
If there is no enforceable debt obligation. Hays v. Bashar 108 Wash. 491,
185 Pac. 814 (1919) Petrsdge v. Osborne, 120 Wash. 21, 206 Pac. 839
(1922).
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covers all of the purchase price except a nominal sum, such as
$1.00, then it is a true conditional sale for the lessor-vendor has
an enforceable claim for substantially all of the purchase price,
and it is not essential that the vendor be given the right, immedi-
ately upon default, to accelerate the obligation and claim the entire
purchase price at once. It is sufficient if he have an enforceable
claim under the contract for the entire purchase price at some time,
provided he also have the alternative to declare a forfeiture. 2 It IS
to be observed that the only purpose to which the conditional vendor
may put his retained title, so far as the vendee is concerned, is to
repossess the chattel on default and forfeit the contract, the title
passes if he sues for the purchase price.
The cases abound with illustrations of the unhappy use of the
word rescind as though it were synonymous with forfeiture.' Con-
tracts are rescinded because of fraud, accident, mistake, or undue
delay, ordinarily this is allowed only when the parties can be put
substantially in statu quo and the consideration must be returned.4
In one sense this results in a forfeiture, but it is a forfeiture only
of the rights to which by the terms of the contract the other party
became entitled when the contract was made. But as used in con-
nection with conditional sale contracts, the forfeiture includes the
payments which have been made. The misconception which may
arise from the lack of precision in the use of these words is illus-
trated in a recent case. A conditional sale of realty provided for a
forfeiture but omitted the usual provision that in that event the
vendor should retain as liquidated damages the payments already
made. The real contention of the vendee, although neither he nor
the court so expressed it, would appear to have been that this con-
tract gave the vendor merely the option to rescind on default by
the vendee, but not to retain the payments. The court very prop-
erly held that the word forfeiture implied the retention of the
payments already made and that it was not necessary specifically
to provide for it. 5
In Washington judicial decision restricts the conditional sale
contract to the use of the actual vendor in the economic sense. It
Quinn v. Parke & Lacey Machinery Co., 5 Wash. 276, 31 Paa. 866
(1892) Kidder v. Wittier Corbmn Mach. Co., 38 Wash. 179, 80 Pac. 301
(1905). For a case distinguishing a consignment from a conditional
sale, see 125 Wash. 301, 216 Pac. 14 (1923).
Grennelle v. Boulass, 48 Wash. 310, 93 Pac. 421 (1908)
Bouvier's Dictionary.
Grays Harbor Nat'l Bank of Aberdeen v. Jacobs & Hart et al., 169
Wash. 674, 14 Pac. (2d) 963 (1932) See also Lundberg v. Kitsap Bank,
79 Wash. 75, 139 Pac. 769 (1914).
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is not adapted to the use of the financier or lender of money He
cannot use the device to avoid the usury laws, nor to obtain the
extraordinary remedies of the conditional vendor. And it is im-
material whether he takes title from the borrower and executes a
contract of conditional sale back to hun,6 or whether he intercepts
the passing of title to the vendee, takes title from the economic
vendor, and himself executes the contract of conditional sale.7
The conditional vendor must be one who actually made the sale
and assumed the risks incident to the business of selling goods.
Where the court finds that it is merely a "security transaction," 8
or a method of securing a money loan,9 it is not enforceable as a
conditional sale contract, and whether it may be enforced as a
chattel mortgage depends upon questions of form, or filing, and of
the parties who are contesting its validity However, the court
drew a sound distinction in a case in which the receiver of the
economic vendor sought to contest the contracts as being in fraud
of the creditors of the economic vendor when the latter had in fact
been paid in full, and held that if the contracts were invalid only
the purchasers or their creditors could legally complain.lo
It is not intended to suggest that the conditional sale is restricted
to the use of the regular merchant, nor that one may not 'buy an
article merely for the purpose of selling it on conditional sale, nor
even that one may not sell under such a contract an article he does
not own and thereafter purchase it to fulfill his contract, but mere-
ly that the lender of money cannot step into the picture when the
seller has found a purchaser, take title from the seller and execute
the contract as nominal vendor. He may, however, as assignee of
the vendor exercise all the rights reserved under the contract,"1
aSeaboard Dairy Credit Corp. v. Paulson, 174 Wash. 594, 25 Pac. (2d)
974 (1933) Olson v. Legal Adj. Bureau, 142 Wash. 446, 253 Pac. 643
(1927). But see Dennis v. Montesano Bank, 38 Wash. 435, 80 Pae. 764(1905).
7Ijon v. Nourse, 104 Wash. 309, 176 Pac. 359 (1918) Mahon -v. Nel-
son, 148 Wash. 110, 268 Pac. 144 (1928).
'Kelley v. Price, 148 Wash. 542, 269 Pac. 842 (1928).
OLahn & Simmons v. Matzen Woolen Mills, 147 Wash. 560, 266 Pac.
697 (1928), where the court also found it met its test of a chattel mortgage.
" Lloyd, Receiver, v. MacCallnum-Donahoe Co., 127 Wash. 180, 21 Pac.
849 (1923).
Commiercial Credit Co. v. Nat'l Cr Co., 143 Wash. 253, 255 Pac. 104
(1927). But the assignee can exercise only the rights of the assignor
and where F advanced money to the vendee to meet payments, under
an indefinite promise of some security, and subsequently paid the vendor
the balance due and took an assignment of the contract, a tender of
the amount of such balance, by the receiver of the vendee, vested title
in the vendee free of the assignee's claim for the money advanced to the
vendee to meet prior payments. Duarte v. Munniok, 85 Wash. 539, 148
Pac. 600 (1915).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
but since the contract is not negotiable his position is not so ad-
vantageous as it would be were he allowed to enter it as vendor.
The chattel mortgage is adapted to the purposes of the dealer in
money From the mere act of advancing the money at the request
of the vendee the law implies an unconditional promise by the ven-
dee to repay him, unless the contract shows that a conditional ob-
ligation only was intended, and the mortgage gives him a security
interest in the chattel. The mortgagor-vendee is bound to pay any
deficiency after the application of the mortgaged property to the
liquidation of this unconditional obligation, while he is assured, at
least theoretically, of receiving the benefit of his investment if
upon foreclosure more than the unpaid purchase price is realized.
Contrasted with the function of the chattel mortgage to secure
an unconditional obligation, the conditional sale contract, so far as
it is a security device, secures performance of a conditional obliga-
tion. If the vendor is willing to abandon his security, he may, in-
,deed, treat it as an ordinary sale on general credit, and sue for the
full balance of the purchase price. But so long as the vendor re-
tains a security interest in the subject matter, the practical effect
of the contract is to give the vendee an option to buy, for any action
by the vendor to require the vendee to pay passes the title free of
any lien.
Since the conditional sale and the mortgage are both a matter
of contract, on the principle of freedom of contract it mght seem
that a vendor should be able to contract for the benefits of both
types of security The reason why the court has not allowed him to
do so seems worthy of consideration. In one case where it had held
that an action to collect the purchase price had resulted in vesting
title in the vendee, by way of explanation the court said that it was
inconceivable that the vendor might have an enforceable debt ob-
ligation against the vendee for the purchase money and at the same
time retain an absolute title.12
It is believed that this formalistic logic is neither the best ex-
planation of, nor the true reason for, the court s decision. In the
first place, if absolute title means anything more than legal title, the
vendor does not retain it, certainly no one could be said to have the
absolute property in a chattel where another has the right to ac-
quire it by acts within his own control. Chancellor Kent wrote,
"Absolute property denotes a full and complete title or dominion
over it, but qualified property in chattels is an exception to the
2 Eilers Mustc House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 156 Pac. 937, L. R. A.
1916E, 613 (1916).
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general right, and means a temporary or special interest, liable to
be totally divested on the happening of some particular event."' 8
The vendor retains the right to forfeit the interest of the vendee in
case of default, but his title is defeasible by proper performance
of the vendee.
In the second place, on the basis of pure logic it is submitted
that the occasion for the passing of title to the vendee nght fully
as well be the collection of the purchase price, as the assertion of
the right to collect. It would not be illogical to give the vendor an
additional election to sell the chattel for the account of the vendee
and collect the deficiency
It would seem that in reaching the result the court is actuated
by social or economic principles rather than logical restraints. The
court feels that the vendor, who is believed to occupy a superior
economic position, would become oppressive if permitted to stipu-
late for too many remedies. It has balanced the conditional ven-
dor's drastic remedy of forfeiture against what in practice amounts
to the permissive character of the vendee's obligation, while
against the unconditional obligation of the mortgagee is balanced
his greater assurance that he will receive the benefit of his invest-
ment.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act applies a chattel mortgage
theory to the conditional sale. It gives the vendor the right in any
case to sell the chattel and collect the deficiency If fifty per cent
of the purchase price has been paid, the statute requires a sale,
and if less than that has been paid the vendee may require the
vendor to sell. And in case of sale, the vendor must account to the
vendee for any surplus over costs and the balance of the purchase
price. 14 The Commissioners found as a practical matter that if
less than fifty per cent had been paid, depreciation generally
amounted to more than would be realized upon forced sale.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
The variety of provisions which have been hopefully inserted in
these instruments, and particularly in the contract of conditional
sale, has given rise to much litigation. Some of these provisions
have been enforced, others have been held merely invalid, and still
others have been held to have automatically converted the pur-
ported conditional sale into a chattel mortgage.
An oral conditional sale contract is valid as between the parties,
" Kent Com. 11th Ed., Vol. II, Lecture XXXV p. 427.21 Sec. 19, 20. The Uniform Act has been adopted in Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West
Virginia and Wisconsin.
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and if a written contract does not contain all the essential pro-
visions, these may be shown by parol.15 However, to constitute
constructive notice, one must be able to determine the whole matter
from the inspection of the records alone."l Where the vendor's
salesman signed a contract which provided that it was not to be
binding until approved by the vendor, and such approval was not
indicated upon the instrument, it was held that the filing of the
instrument did not constitute constructive notice.17  Mr. Justice
Tolman, concurring specially, argued that logically the require-
ments as to signature in order to give constructive notice should
be less stringent than the requirements to determine whether the
contract was binding between the parties. And it would seem that
this contract at least would have put an inquirer on notice that
such a contract might exist, particularly if the vendee were in
possession of the chattel. But the Washington Court appears to
have reversed the situation and to have required greater precmion
in the matter of signature to make filing constructive notice, than
to make the contract binding as between the parties.' Whatever
the logic of the case, one cannot help but have considerable sym-
pathy with the rule the court has followed, for constructive notice
so frequently does not amount to actual notice until after a loss
has occurred and an attempt is made to allocate it. If a party is
to be given this extraordinary protection of constructive notice to
offset the deceptive situation arising where possession is divorced
Gaffvey v. O'Leary, 155 Wash. 171, 283 Pac. 1091 (1930). In Worley
v. Met. Motor Car Co., 72 Wash. 243, 130 Pac. 107 (1913), the court said
that if a contract is not "signed" within ten days it is not a conditional
sale, relying on American M1lultigraph Sales Co. v. Jones, 58 Wash. 619.
109 Pac. 108 (1910) but that case merely dealt with a contract not filed
within ten days and said nothing about when it was signed. Of course,
since it could not well be filed without some signature, if signed more
than ten days after delivery it could not operate as constructive notice.
°Rychen v. Tacoma Farmers Creamery, 127 Wash. 359, 220 Pac. 780
(1923).
"State ex rel Yates Am. Mach. Co. v. Svp'r Ct., 147 Wash. 294, 266
Pae. 134 (1928).
" In Seymour v. Landon, 128 Wash. 682, 224 Pac. 3 (1924), a contract
was held not valid as notice where it was signed, Vendor, by .................... I
with the blank not filled. In Kennery v. No. Western Junk Co., 108 Wash.
656, 185 Pac. 636 (1919) it was held that the vendor could not forfeit
the contract and recover from the transferee of the vendee, where it was
signed, Times Square Garage, by ------------------------- with the blank not filled.
Holcomb, J., dissenting. But where the vendor took possession before
any creditor obtained a specific lien, and before the appointment of a
trustee in bankruptcy, it was held valid, although the vendor had not
signed the contract at all. Jennings v. Schwartz, 86 Wash. 202, 149 Pac.
947 (1915), reversing 82 Wash. 209, 144 Pac. 39 (1914). See Wright v.
Seattle Grocery Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919) re requirement to
bind the parties.
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from title, perhaps it is not asking too much to require the record
to disclose the precise facts in the case.
Where a chattel mortgage was not filed within the ten day period
after its execution, but was subsequently re-dated and again
acknowledged and filed, it was held invalid as notice because it
was not again signed and because it did not contain a new affidavit
of good faith.19
Where a chattel mortgage was not filed within the ten-day period
state that the vendor may retain the payments already made, this
may be implied, if one may reason by analogy to the land con-
tracts.20 A provision for retention of payments upon forfeiture
is not a provision for a penalty, but for liquidated damages, for
the longer the vendor is kept out of possession the greater is his
actual damage.21 If payments are accepted late, a notice to the
vendee that thereafter payments must be made on the due date
or forfeiture will be declared will restore the strict rule as to future
payments, and the parties may contract that no such notice shall
be required and that acceptance of late payments shall not con-
stitute a waiver of the right of forfeiture for delay in subsequent
payments.' 2 Where the contract provides for the taking of nego-
tiable notes secured by a mortgage on the subject of the sale, the
giving of such notes and mortgage is a species of payment, and
until they are given the vendor may declare a forfeiture for de-
fault.2 3 The contract may validly provide that the vendee shall
have no right to stipulate for the application of payments, and
that the vendor may apply payments as he sees fit to any other
indebtedness of the vendee to the vendor, retaining title to the
chattel until all such indebtedness is paid.2 4
A conditional sale contract is not negotiable, and cannot be made
negotiable even by express provision, thus a contract which pro-
vided that the assignee of the vendor should take free of any
counterclaim or recoupment was held not to protect the assignee
from the defense of, and penalty for, usury 25 And where the ven-
dee had signed a contract in triplicate, but before taking possession
did not see to the cancellation of all copies of the contract, the
"Robmnson, et al. v. Whittier 112 Wash. 6, 191 Pac. 763 (1920).
:Note 5, supra.
2'Eilers Musw House v. Ortental Co., 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023
(1912).
=Lundberg v. Switzer 146 Wash. 416, 263 Pac. 178 (1928). See also
Drumheller v. Bird, 170 Wash. 14, 15 Pac. (2d) 260 (1932).
EEdison Gen'l Elec. Co. v. walters, 10 Wash. 14, 38 Pac. 752 (1894).
2, Unton Machnery v. Thompson, 98 Wash. 119, 167 Pac. 95 (1917).
5Motor Con. Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931)
Autom-otive Collateral Co. v. Beckman, 152 Wash. 534, 278 Pac. 417 (1929).
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of the car turned in another car and a ring in full payment, but
purchaser of the contract from the vendor was held subject to the
defense of payment. 2  Where the contract provided that all pay-
ments were to be made at a certain place, but did not mention a
collateral agreement whereby the vendee was to be allowed to pay
in advertising, the vendee was permitted to set up this collateral
agreement against the vendor's assignee. 27 But where the contract
read that payment was to be "spot cash" this was construed as
an express stipulation against any offset at the time the contract
was made.2 Thus, although a conditional sale contract cannot be
made fully negotiable by contract, it is possible for the vendee
to stipulate for the existence of a state of facts at the time the
contract is made, and if it appeared to have been made to induce
an assignee to take the contract, presumably the vendee would be
estopped from denying it.
A further distinction has been made between such contracts
and commercial paper. The vendor was accustomed to add to his
ordinary sale price the amount of the discount he was required to
give to his assignee. The contract embodied within it a promissory
note for the full amount. When the assignee sued the vendor on
his guaranty, the latter set up the defense that the agreement was
usurious. The court found that when the note and contract were
embodied in one instrument it was not commercial paper, but a
sale plus a guaranty 29 It would perhaps be difficult to see any
validity in the defense in any case.
Certain provisions of the contract may be valid and enforceable
'Nat'X Mtg. Co. v. King, 152 Wash. 614, 278 Pac. 697 (1929).
21 Doub v. Rawson, 142 Wash. 190, 252 Pac. 920 (1927). But cf. Long
v. McEvoy, 133 Wash. 472, 233 Pac. 930, 236 Pac. 806 (1925), where a
party signed conditional sale as vendee believing It was a bill of sale
of his old car, and was held liable to the assignee of the contract on
the basis of comparative innocence.
"Nat. Bank of Tacoma v. Puget Snd. Lbr Co., 104 Wash. 363, 176 Pac.
553 (1918).
-lllartin v. McAvoy, 130 W'ash. 641, 228 Pac. 694 (1924). As to the
limitations of a guaranty and also a further indication of non-negotia-
bility a recent case has held that a guaranty running to the vendor to
secure performance by the vendee, is limited by the amount actually
owing to the vendor. The original vendee sold his interest and induced
the vendor to execute a new contract of conditional sale to the new vendee,
himself signing as guarantor. The vendor with the consent of the guar-
antor then "discounted" the contract with the assignee, though perhaps
it should have been called a pledge, for a portion of its value, but under
an existing arrangement the assignee was to hold the balance of all
contracts as security for an antecedent obligation. The contract assigned
thus covered a secret equity of ownership of the guarantor, and the
guarantor really owed the vendor nothing. The guarantor tendered the
assignee an amount sufficient to cover his actual advances plus costs
and a reasonable profit, and the court held that the assignee could not
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even after the vendor has declared a forfeiture, notwithstanding
the argument that the forfeiture extinguishes all rights arising out
of the contract. The court has taken the very reasonable position
that while the forfeiture extinguishes the obligation to pay the
purchase price, it does not necessarily extinguish certain severable
provisions looking to the situation after forfeiture. Thus the
court has held the vendee liable on an agreement to pay attorney
fees in an action to repossess ;30 or if he agreed to return the prop-
erty in case of forfeiture, he is liable for the cost ;31 and an agree-
ment to pay freight on shipment both ways is an independent
promise and may be enforced after forfeiture.32
In view of these decisions the writer believes that lawyers might
well consider what effect might be given to a provision that the
vendee agrees, m case of forfeiture, to pay a reasonable rental for
the property from the date of forfeiture, or after a reasonable
time in which to return the property, until the actual physical and
legal redelivery of the property to the vendor, whether the vendee
actually uses the property or not. Such a provision would be of
more value in case of a conditional sale of realty, but in the case
of a large truck which might be at a considerable distance at the
time of forfeiture, it might be important.
Where goods are sold on conditional sale to be put in the yen-
dee's general stock of merchandise to be sold, the retained title
is void as to creditors unless the contract provides for an account-
ing of the proceeds.3 The same result is reached in the case of a
chattel mortgage, and taking possession prior to bankruptcy does
not perfect the vendor's claim.3 4 Even if such mortgage forbids
sale without consent of the mortgagee, it is invalid as to creditors
unless it provides for a method of disposal and an accounting, and
hold the guarantor for more than -the tender. C. I. T Corp v. Strazn,
Wash., 34 Pac. (2d) 440 (1934). See also re guaranty, Sterling v. Louden-
back, 155 Wash. 36, 283 Pac. 476 (1929).
"Motor Con. Co. v. Van Der Volgen, supra note 25, Seaboard Sec. Co.
v. Berg, 170 Wash. 681, 17 Pac. (2d) 646 (1932).
"Note 1, supra.
2 Unson Mack. & Supply v. Mcush, 104 Wash. 62, 175 Pac. 559 (1918).
Schultz, Trustee zn Bankruptcy, v. Wesco Oil Co., 149 Wash. 21, 270
Pac. 130 (1928) Eisenberg *v. Nichols, 22 Wash. 70, 79 A. S. R. 917(1900).
"Warner v. Hibler, 146 Wash. 651, 264 Pac. 423 (1928) Tahoma Fur-
nace Co. v. Schannon, 138 Wash. 90, 244 Pac. 271 (1926). Wineburgh 'V.
Schaer, 2 W T. 328 (1884), which relies on Robznson v. Elliott, 22 Wall.
513. A chattel mortgage on a floating stock of merchandise has also been
held void for indefiniteness as against attaching creditors, where it
provided that the proceeds of all sales were to be held for the sole
benefit of the mortgagee, either by paying the debt or keeping up or
adding to the stock of goods. Byrd v. Forbes, 3 W T. 318 (1887).
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a judgment in a foreclosure action is not res adjudicata as to at-
taching creditors who were not parties to that action.3 5
The question of when a lease will be construed as-a conditional
sale has been already considered.3 6
A conditional sale contract which provides that on default the
vendor can resell the property and hold the vendee for the de-
ficiency, is a chattel mortgage,37 and is void as to third parties
unless it is executed and filed as such."' And even where the con-
tract provided that unless the law in regard to conditional sales
provided otherwise, the vendor could sell and hold the vendee for
a deficiency, it was held to be a chattel mortgage, restricting the
vendor to an action of foreclosure rather than replevin, although
no third parties were involved and the question of holding the
vendee for the deficiency had not arisen. 9 Mr. Justice Beals dis-
sented on the grounds that the parties intended a conditional sale
and thought the court should merely hold the provision for de-
ficiency judgment invalid. In a later case,"° involving a contract
which provided that the vendor could pursue all remedies and fail-
ing to collect could then take the chattel back, the vendor having
treated it as a conditional sale and repossessed, the court held the
other provision invalid and the contract stood as a conditional sale.
And in an earlier case where the vendee was to act as agent of the
vendor to sell the goods, but the vendor reserved the right to take
the goods back and hold the vendee for the deficiency, the vendor
having repossessed, he was held to have made an election and was
refused recovery for the balance in an action against the vendee
and his guarantor.4 ' In still another case where the contract pro-
vided that on repossession the entire balance would become due,
the vendor's assignee was allowed to repossess the car and avoid
the sale, instead of confirming it and making the obligation for
purchase money a debt.42
If the provision for a deficiency judgment is a valid conditional
Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Mlussellman, 134 Wash. 116, 234 Pac.
1033 (1925).
"Note 2, supra.
SGervast et al. v. Seattle & Ramner Valley Ry. Co., 148 Wash. 635.
269 Pac. 1050 (1928) Roberts v. Speck, 170 Wash. 324, 16 Pac. (2d) 463
(1932).
38 West An. Finance Co. v. Finstad, 146 Wash. 315, 262 Pac. 636 (1928)
Lahn & Simmons v. Matzen Woolen Mills, note 9, sutpra.
'Raymond Bros. Import Fertilizer Co. v. Thomas, 159 Wash. 550, 294
Pac. 219 (1931).
,oAllis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Hedlund Lbr & Mfg. Co., 164 Wash. 296,
2 Pac. (2) 708 (1931).
41 Jordon v. Peek, 103 Wash. 94, 173 Pac. 726 (1918).
Com'rerctal Credit Co. v. Nat. Cr Co., note 11, supra.
CONDITIONAL SALES
sale stipulation by the law of the state where the contract is made
it is similarly valid in Washington.48
Thus the court would seem to have entertained two views as to
the effect of a deficiency clause in its operations as between the
parties, although it would probably never be allowed to operate as
constructive notice unless recorded as a chattel mortgage. One
view is that such clause automatically converts the contract into a
chattel mortgage, even though the vendor's first effort is to assert
a remedy incident to a valid conditional sale. The other is that such
deficiency clause is invalid because repugnant. Thus far the prob-
lem has generally arisen where the vendor is asserting, or -has pre-
mously asserted, a right to which he is entitled only in case it is a
conditional sale. Since the formalities of executing and recording
a chattel mortgage are more involved, the situation is not apt to
arise where the creditors of the vendee are endeavoring to circum-
vent such an instrument because it was recorded as a chattel mort-
gage and not as a conditional sale. But since, because of the harsh-
ness of forfeitures, conditional sales are not favored in the law, it
would probably be construed as a mortgage. As against a party
with notice it has been held valid as a chattel mortgage. 44
A distinction has been drawn between a conditional sale and a
sale and pledge. The vendor deposited roubles in escrow and took
the vendee's note for the unpaid balance. The contract provided
that the vendor could take back the roubles but contained no for-
feiture clause. The court, apparently doubting the evidence of
withdrawal of the roubles, held that in any case, since there was
no forfeiture clause, it was a pledge and not a conditional sale,
and allowed recovery on the note.4
The subject matter of a chattel mortgage must be tangible prop-
erty An instrument in the form of a chattel mortgage covered the
present and future earings of a water company, but permitted
the company to use half of its collections for specified purposes of
its own. At the first hearing the court was disposed to find it in-
valid as against garnishing creditors because it lacked the re-
quired affidavit of good faith, but on re-hearing it found it to be
an assignment and not a mortgage, but the garnishing creditors
still prevailed for lack of evidence that the garnishment took over
"Canpbell v. Frets, 167 Wash. 576, 9 Pac. (2d) 1083 (1932). The con-
tract was made in North Dakota.
"Morgan Organ Go. v. Armour, 173 'Wash. 462, 23 Pac. (2d) 887
(1933).
"'Lew v. Colby, 137 Wash. 476, 243 Pac. 18 (1926).
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half of the earnings.46 The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act pro-
vides for a chattel mortgage upon book accounts.47
As to the subject matter of a conditional sale, an interesting case
involved the following facts. Under an unrecorded contract, S de-
livered shingle bolts to B who was to pay for them at a price per
thousand shingles, the price varying with the market. B's creditors
attached the bolts. The court found that B impliedly agreed to
manufacture the shingles, and that until they were manufactured
there was nothing in existence to be the subject matter of the sale,
that title of the bolts did not pass, and that there was no condi-
tional sale to require recording. The dissenting opimon in the case
argued that this was a sale of shingle bolts with title reserved until
the value was determined, and that the majority holding avoided
the object of the recording statute.48
A consignment has been distinguished from a conditional sale,
on the grounds that the consignee was not obligated to buy 49 And
where an owner places title in an agent to facilitate making re-
pairs and selling the car, no recordation is required to protect his
interest against a judgment creditor of the agent, and a judgment
creditor buying on execution sale is not a bona fide purchaser for
value.50
"Heermans v. B~akeslee, 97 Wash. 647, 167 Pac. 128 (1917). On first
hearing: 93 Wash. 595, 161 Pac. 489.
' Sec. 2. So far this Act has not been adopted by any state.
Peterson v. Wooiery, 9 Wash. 390 (1894)
Rilers Music House v. Fairbanks, 80 Wash. 379, 114 Pac. 885 (1914).
Ransom v. Wickstront, 84 Wash. 419, 146 Pac. 1041, L. R. A. 1916A,
*To be continued.
